Knowledge Management in the Canadian Army
- Tzipi Lebkovich
- Jan 1, 2006
- 10 min read
Co-authored with Adi Kardonchik and Major Yael Kantor - Israel Air Force, IDF
Girard, John, "The Canadian Knowledge Management Model", KMPRO Journal, spring 2005, vol.2 n.1, pp. 9-18.
The term "knowledge management" has become a "buzzword" in organizations, including the Air Force. Nevertheless, we decided to address this topic in this article as it clarifies the connection between security knowledge management and military readiness.
The Canadian Army has been managing its security knowledge for years, yet it believes an organizational knowledge management strategy must be developed for optimal knowledge management.
The knowledge management strategy presented in the article is appropriate for the Canadian Army within Canadian society, and it is valid and necessary for any organization, including the Air Force. We believe that ideas from this strategy can certainly be adopted while adapting them to the cultural characteristics of each organization, which would lead to more successful implementation.
Below is an adaptation of Lieutenant-Colonel John Girard's article, “Knowledge Manager of the Canadian National Defense Department.” The article's title is "Defense knowledge management: a fad?"
Introduction
Knowledge management is not a fad but an important subject that must be prioritized in the Canadian Defense Department. Knowledge management in the Canadian Army is an integrative and systematic approach that, when implemented in an organization, allows for optimal use of accurate, relevant, and up-to-date information.
Knowledge management enables knowledge discovery and innovation, encourages the organization to develop into a learning organization, and enhances understanding by integrating all existing information sources, individual information sources, and collective knowledge and experience.
The Canadian Army has already been recognized as a knowledge-managing organization, so why invest now in developing a knowledge-management strategy?
Three reasons necessitate institutionalizing knowledge management in the military at this time:
The organization and environment have changed over the past decade; the pace of events has increased, the level of certainty has decreased, and new threats (such as terrorism) have emerged. Additionally, the economic reality of the 1990s in Canada led to a leaner military structure, which is more efficient and economical, but this also came at a cost; many advisors and assistants who were previously in the organization and constituted organizational memory are no longer there, and there are fewer opportunities for sharing knowledge in general and tacit knowledge in particular.
Changes in thinking and perception: In the Canadian General Staff's annual report for 2002-2003, the Canadian General Staff noted: "We need to change the way we perceive and think... We are moving from an industrial and hierarchical mindset to a world driven by sharing and human networks... We need to learn to think, behave, and act as one NODE at a collaborative level, which includes the fighters, our combat environments, our civilian colleagues in the police, other security agencies, and our allies. If the characteristic of the industrial era was linear, vertical thinking, then the characteristic of the new era is horizontal, lateral thinking... Knowledge management will be one of the central levers for creating change."
Technological changes: Technological development has improved our lives in many areas; for example, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities have improved significantly. However, in the area of organizing and managing knowledge, there has been some regression, as today only a few organizations have electronic systems for smart filing of information at such a high level, as in the old method that relied on an organized filing system for quick retrieval of documents and maintaining their currency.
All the abovementioned changes emphasize that the military must adapt to the changes occurring within and in its environment and treat knowledge as a critical resource for increasing its operational efficiency and effectiveness.
Scenario: 12 Hours of Knowledge - How Knowledge Sharing Benefited Operation SAGE
The scenario described below clarifies how operational knowledge management assisted in creating operational readiness in real time.
On the morning of October 29, 2007, following a natural disaster in Haiti, the Canadian Army's Humanitarian Assistance Team arrived in Haiti in less than 24 hours. It was the first international team to respond to the call for help. The rapid response was possible thanks to knowledge sharing.
Here is the scenario:
On Sunday, the commander of the Humanitarian Assistance Team woke up to the sound of his personal information system. It was 6:15 am, and his operations officer had just sent him an urgent email. The email contained news that a hurricane had suddenly changed its course toward Haiti. The commander was surprised, as he and his team had been tracking the storm, and the forecast was that the storm would dissipate before reaching land.
After reading the message, the commander opened his laptop, inserted his identification card, and wirelessly connected to his knowledge space. The display contained the unit's status: a collection of critical data and information maintained by his staff. The knowledge displayed, in an intuitive manner, was designed to aid decision-making. He was pleased to see that his soldiers were available, except for one officer on assignment on another island in the region. He then read news from several sites about weather conditions in Haiti for the next 72 hours.
The commander felt this was a team mission, so he created a shared workspace for the operation. The content of the workspace was based on lessons from previous operations. (There were debriefings available because at the end of each mission, a debriefing was conducted through which flaws were identified and workspace requirements were redefined.)
When he returned to his knowledge space, he typed "Assistance Force Operations in Haiti" and discovered that the Humanitarian Assistance Team had assisted on the island in 1997 and 2004. A summary of events and relevant links were available. He dragged the links to the shared workspace to ensure that the information he found would be available to team members. Additionally, he saw a list of experts in Haiti (experts on international law, policy, intelligence, etc.) and added this list to the shared workspace.
The commander then opened the list of team members on the operation in 1997 but did not recognize any names. In any case, he dragged the list to the shared workspace. He decided to connect to the software for locating people in the Canadian Army to find the force commander from 1997. The system scanned the data requester's classification to ensure the information could be transferred to him. This system was new. Before introducing this system, it was necessary to establish telephone contact with human resources to get permission to access the database.
The data he received from the database showed that the mission commander had retired in 2006 with the rank of Brigadier General but was still registered as a volunteer for reserves if needed. The commander added this information to the shared workspace.
When searching for information about the force that carried out the mission in 2004, he was surprised to discover that the deputy commander of the force at that time was his colleague. He added this data to the shared workspace. The commander saw a flashing icon next to his colleague's name, indicating he was online. He sent him a message directly to his cell phone and asked him to call back.
While waiting for a response, he began to browse the Military Lessons Library (the lessons library contained lessons from all military branches on various topics such as flight safety, international laws, etc.). He could locate a wealth of useful knowledge with a button. For example, he discovered that 2004 the mission team encountered difficulties using diskettes because the sand damaged the magnetic media. The solution they found then was to use USB devices. He also discovered that in 1997, Cuba had a legal/political problem regarding the status of the force. There were additional issues highlighted in the lessons library, which he transferred to the shared workspace and emphasized to the operations officer the importance of legally arranging the stay on the island.
At 10:00 am, his colleague sent him an instant message. The commander asked his colleague several questions about previous operations, and he answered. After a few minutes, the commander received a message from the head of the joint operations force in Ottawa stating that by evening, a signed alert order would be issued. The commander invited the force head to examine the situation through the shared workspace and reviewed his actions during the morning with him. The force had invited the commander to a classified briefing at 4:00 pm in Ottawa.
At 11:30 am, the commander received a message on his cell phone from the shared workspace that the force head had issued an operation order. The commander forwarded the information to his operations officer and ordered him to act according to procedures.
At noon, the commander took his laptop and headed toward headquarters in Ottawa. At 1:15 pm, the commander was hit and killed in a head-on collision.
At 2:00 pm, news of the accident reached the force head. He ordered assistance for the family. At the same time, they began to search for a new commander for the operation. The operation could not be postponed or canceled because the Prime Minister had declared that Canada would send an assistance force within 24 hours.
The process of selecting a new commander was simple because, in 2006, it was decided that a number 2 would be appointed for every senior command position. In this case, a female officer who had begun learning the role ten months earlier was appointed number 2.
At 3:00 pm, the officer was informed of her new appointment. Since the officer lived near the command, she could meet with the force head later. Meanwhile, she gained access to the shared workspace and saw what had been done so far. She knew the force commander from 2004 and decided to contact him. They arranged to meet. During the meeting, the former force commander shared his difficult experiences from the event, stories that later proved to be life-saving.
At 6:15 pm, the new commander met with the force head, just 12 hours after she was appointed to the position. At the meeting, the commander stated that she was ready to depart.
The scenario you just read was written by the author of the article, Lieutenant-Colonel John Girard.
This story is about the synergy between technology, leadership, and culture and the power of sharing.
Colonel Girard distributed the scenario by email to clarify and demonstrate how knowledge management could assist commanders in charge of security. He emailed the scenario because meeting with all organizational managers was impossible.
The scenario was highly successful and was published in the Canadian Army journal.
The Canadian Army's Knowledge Management Strategy - The Knowledge Pyramid
The currently accepted concept in the Canadian Army is the extended pyramid, which contains three basic levels: data, information, and knowledge, and above them, two additional levels: understanding and wisdom (according to Ackoff's theory). The knowledge creation process is derived from the three basic levels and is typically performed at the team level to assist the commander. In contrast, the commander performs the fourth level - understanding - exclusively. At this level, the commander relies on the knowledge created in the basic stage, exercises his judgment, and makes decisions while relying on his experience and intuition (this level is primarily based on tacit knowledge and less on explicit knowledge). The level of understanding is the level that most Canadian forces reach. The fifth level - wisdom, this utopian level, will be achieved only by a few experienced commanders with high intuition. This is the Knowledge Edge. Integrating the fifth level is relatively new in the Canadian Army, and its leaders are innovative commanders.
Inukshuk - The Eskimo Model
The Inukshuk is an Eskimo icon depicting an arrangement of stones in the shape of a person. This icon serves in Eskimo society as a marking for navigation purposes, marking hunting areas, marking hiding places for food and equipment during hunting, and marking sacred areas. Each of the stones in the human figure represents components of the Canadian Army's knowledge management strategy. This icon is well-known in Canadian society and was chosen because it is vital in Canadian history and tradition and represents uniqueness and honor.
The Inukshuk shown in the following diagram consists of ten stones. Moving or removing one stone would collapse the entire figure. All components represent five enablers of knowledge management in the organization: the figure's base includes three enablers: technology, leadership, and culture; the fourth enabler is the process (six smaller stones); and the fifth enabler - the head of the figure represents measurement. All five enablers are supposed to ensure knowledge management in the Canadian military organization.
The Base in the Model
Technology: Technology is an enabler of knowledge management; however, it is a double-edged sword from a security knowledge management perspective. It must be ensured that it serves as an enabling factor (such as video conferencing) and not a hindering factor (such as infrastructure limitations).
Leadership: Organizational knowledge management is essential for developing the leadership currently required for the Canadian Army. The organization must emphasize recruiting high-potential leaders and providing them with knowledge infrastructure to develop their understanding and wisdom capabilities (fourth and fifth levels in the pyramid). Such leaders will know how to use and implement explicit and tacit operational knowledge for optimal performance of their operational missions and to lead the organization to fulfill its purpose.
Culture: Culture is a complex concept in knowledge management. There are many dimensions to culture, but one of the central ones in the security field is security culture - confidentiality, strict adherence to secrecy, and compartmentalization. Security culture poses an obstacle to effective knowledge management, so the accepted norm must be changed from "need to know" to "need to share," which is not a simple task.
The Process in the Model
After stabilizing the technological, leadership, and cultural foundation, it is time to implement processes that lead to knowledge sharing and create a successful knowledge management environment that includes explicit knowledge, especially tacit knowledge. Most Western cultures emphasize explicit knowledge - writing doctrines, tactics, and procedures and assuming that everyone will have the necessary knowledge to perform their missions, unlike Eastern cultures, which emphasize tacit knowledge. We need a balance between the two cultures.
The Inukshuk model helps formulate these relationships practically. The stones in the model represent the four ways knowledge can be created or transferred.
Socialization: From tacit to tacit, sharing experiences and trials, O.J.T., and battle analyses in interpersonal meetings constitute an effective way of transferring tacit knowledge between role partners. One common example is sharing experiences through war stories, in which the storyteller describes his experiences and feelings rather than just the dry facts.
Externalization: From tacit to explicit, debriefings, lessons learned, and war diaries are instances where tacit information and knowledge can be developed into explicit knowledge at the levels of understanding and wisdom.
Combination: From explicit to explicit, strategy and combat doctrines. A person can code knowledge into a repository through the coding process so that others can access and use it. An organization that translates its modes of operation into standards and procedures is an example of a combination.
Internalization: From explicit to tacit, knowledge created from the fusion of clear and organized explicit knowledge with vague tacit knowledge. Learning by doing, accumulated experience, values, and ethos are examples of tacit knowledge created in this process. In the Canadian Army, an ethical code was formulated, and new principles and commitments were defined with the aim that military personnel would internalize them and implement them in complex situations, initially instinctively, and over time, internalize these values and act according to judgment - what is right/good and what is wrong/bad.
Measurement: Any security knowledge management plan must be based on a clear strategy and defined in terms of outcomes. However, measuring the impact of a knowledge management plan is problematic because some of its outputs are not measurable (abstract). Does listening to a war story create any output? It is difficult to give a clear and authoritative answer to this.
Bibliography
Girard, John, "Defence Knowledge Management: A Passing Fad?", Canadian Military Journal, summer 2004, pp. 17-28. Girard, John, "The Canadian Knowledge Management Model", KMPRO Journal, spring 2005, vol.2 n.1, pp. 9-18.
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